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Library Privacy in Context
The English word private comes from the Latin privatus meaning "with-
drawn from public life, deprived of office, peculiar to oneself, or private,"
and which is itself the past participle otprivare, meaning "to bereave or to
deprive."
1 The Greek word idiotes means both
"private person" and
"ignorant, ill-informed person" and is derived from idios meaning both
"private" and "peculiar" and which gives us the English idiot and
idiosyncrasy.
2
Hannah Arendt has suggested that a large part of what we consider the
private and intimate realm was held by the classical Greeks to be the sphere
of mere necessity and material dependence.
3 A citizen of classical Athens
had to leave the family and household and enter the public realm the
polis in order to achieve freedom and the realization of his human
potential.
4
Arendt's view has been criticized recently, but even her critic
concedes that life as a member of the polis was primary. "One's existence,
one's values, one's fulfillment as a member of the human species was
dependent on being a member of the polis."
5
All of this suggests that the classical civilizations had an idea of
privacy that is foreign to ours today. They devoted a lot of attention to the
question of what constitutes the good life. Yet they assigned a modest role
to privacy as a part of life. Certainly consideration of the ancients does not
require us to throw over our own understanding of privacy. It should bring
us to give some thought to it as a value in modern life.
The Value of Privacy
It has been difficult even to settle on a definition of privacy. There
have been enough variations to fuel a continuing debate about whether
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privacy is an integrated, coherent concept, or is instead an aggregation of
distinct interests.
6 One attempt at a unitary definition is that privacy is the
right to be let alone, but this is too vague and general to be of much help.
7
For Alan Westin, a leading commentator, privacy is the claim to control
when and to what extent information about a person will be communi-
cated to others.
8 A definition offered by Ruth Gavison is more comprehen-
sive. Privacy is the limitation of access to a person, and this has three
aspects: the limitation of information about a person, the limitation of the
attention directed at a person, and the limitation of physical access to a
person.
9 These aspects represent interests we have in seclusion or solitude,
in freedom from observation or scrutiny, and in withholding information
about ourselves.
What is the value of privacy? I lean toward thinking of privacy as an
instrumental value. That approach lets us see how privacy is the means by
which we attain other valued ends. There are several of these: creativity,
reflection, psychological well-being, and individual autonomy. Privacy
has been called the essential context for the development of relations
founded on trust, love, or friendship.
1 There is wide agreement that
privacy is indispensable in our modern world to the dignity of persons, to
respect for persons, and to our fulfillment as persons.
But the matter is more complicated than that. Take the relation
between privacy and liberty. It is widely agreed that a basic function of
privacy is to insulate the individual from public scrutiny, to place a buffer
between personal preference and prevailing social norms. But is it better to
insulate ourselves from compliance with public norms? Shouldn't we
instead challenge them openly and force them to change? Stanley Benn,
11
in an early article, captures this tension:
It is not only the authorities we fear. We are all under strong pressure
from our friends and neighbors to live up to the roles in which they cast
us. If we disappoint them we risk disapproval, and what may be worse
their ridicule. For many of us, we are free to be ourselves only within that
area from which observers can legitimately be excluded. We need a
sanctuary or retreat in which we can drop the mask, desist for a while
from projecting on the world the image we want to be accepted as
ourselves, an image that may reflect the values of our peers rather than
the realities of our natures. To remain sane, we need a closed environ-
ment, open only to those we trust, with whom we have an unspoken
understanding that whatever is revealed goes no further.
Put in this way, however, the case for privacy begins to look like a
claim to the conditions of life necessary only for second-grade men in a
second-grade society. For the man who is truly independent the auton-
omous man is the one who has the strength of mind to resist the
pressure to believe with the rest, and has the courage to act on his
convictions....Socrates did not ask to be allowed to teach philosophy in
private. ...Of course, there are not many like Socrates in any society. ...Not
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many of us perhaps have gone so far along the road to moral maturity
that we can bear unrelenting exposure to criticism without flinching.
Benn's view may strike the reader as rigorous, even nai've. It needs to be
qualified by Gavison's perspective
12
on the same problem.
There are important limits on our capacity to change positive morality,
and thus to affect social pressures to conform. This may even cause an
inability to change institutional norms. ...If an individual prefers to
present a public conformity rather than an unconventional autonomy,
that is his choice.... Ideally, it would be preferable if we could all disre-
gard prejudices and irrelevancies. It is clear, however, that we cannot.
Given this fact, it may be best to let one's ignorance mitigate one's
prejudice.
The Principles of Fair Information Practices
Concern about the collection of large amounts of personal informa-
tion by both public and private organizations emerged as a major issue
during the 1960s and early 1970s. The response of some institutions,
including libraries, has been substantial enough that by 1982 Arthur
Miller, one of the first to sound an alarm in his Assault on Privacy,
13
was
prepared to say that a "Privacy Revolution" had taken place.
1 An early
and influential discussion of the problem was Records, Computers and the
Rights of Citizens.
1 This was a report issued in 1973 by an advisory
committee to the Secretary of the U.S. Department of Health, Education
and Welfare. It was the first report to develop the idea of fair information
practices. These principles have had a substantial impact on the formula-
tion of public policy regarding large-scale personal data gathering.
The principles of fair information practices can be stated briefly:
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1 . There must be no personal-data recordkeeping systems whose existence
is secret.
2. There must be a way to find out what information about a person is in a
record and how it is used.
3. There must be a way for an individual to prevent information about
him obtained for one purpose from being used or made available for
other purposes without his consent.
4. There must be a way for an individual to correct or amend a record of
personal information about him.
5. Any organization creating, using, or disseminating records of personal
data must assure the reliability of the data for its intended use and must
take reasonable precautions to prevent its misuse.
Reliability here means the combination of accuracy, completeness, timeli-
ness, and pertinence. Timeliness requires that information which has
become "stale" be purged from a record of personal information.
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The first two principles have to do with simple disclosure. The fourth
principle and much of the fifth are grounded on a requirement of fairness
or due process. The critics of organizational gathering of personal data
have often expressed the concern that decisions are made about people's
lives without any assurance of the accuracy or completeness of the support-
ing information. The result is an increased risk that decisions will be
wrong because of an inaccurate, distorted, or superficial record. This has
more to do with fairness in decision-making than with privacy. In any case,
the concern is legitimate.
The third principle imposes a restriction on the movement and use of
personal data. It speaks to a public expectation that information shall be
used only by the organization to which the disclosure was made. Strict
application of this principle would prevent the commingling of informa-
tion in a single database, as well as the passing of one database against
another in order to identify correspondences.
The principle of pertinence demands that only information which is
relevant will be considered. It recognizes that unfairly prejudicial informa-
tion, information which should have no bearing on decision-making,
must be kept out of personal data records. The timeliness principle
acknowledges that with the passage of time and changes in circumstances
personal information becomes "stale." It requires that only relatively
recent information be retained in data files.
Experience has taught us that substantive restrictions on the collec-
tion of information by organizations are necessary. But not everyone
agrees. Richard Posner, an economist who has written provocative articles
on privacy, insists that we should credit users of information with the
ability to be rational discounters of its relevance and importance. He
sternly disapproves of legislative intervention that imposes restrictions on
the consideration of discreditable personal data.
17
For example, he objects
strenuously to provisions of the "Fair Credit Reporting Act" which pre-
vent reporting of bankruptcies more than ten years old or of criminal
convictions more than seven years old.
18
Legal Aspects of Library Privacy
At the same time that general privacy concerns began to emerge, the
issue of privacy in library circulation records came rapidly into view.
During the spring and summer of 1970 agents of the U.S. Bureau of
Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms attempted to examine the circulation
records of public libraries in several cities. The American Library Associa-
tion responded quickly to the threat that rummaging through library
circulation records was on the point of becoming a standard "investigative
technique" of some law enforcement agencies. The "ALA Policy on Confi-
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dentiality of Library Records" was approved in January of 1971 and with
minor revisions continues in effect today.
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Section 1 of the policy recommends that each library "formally adopt
a policy which specifically recognizes its circulation records and other
records identifying the names of library users to be confidential in nature."
Section 2 expands on the general statement by recommending that patron
records not be disclosed to any government agency "except pursuant to
such process, order, or subpoena as may be authorized under the authority
of, and pursuant to, federal, state, or local law...." Section 3 recommends
that libraries "resist the issuance or enforcement of any such process, order,
or subpoena until such time as proper showing of good cause has been
made in a court of competent jurisdiction." The ALA policy is commend-
able for its clarity, except on one account. Neither Section 3 nor any of the
accompanying materials gives any guidance on what is involved in resist-
ing the enforcement of a subpoena.
The first difficulty is that a subpoena is issued ex parte, that is, at the
request of those seeking the witness* attendance and without the participa-
tion of anyone else. An attorney or prosecutor, in connection with pending
litigation or a criminal investigation, need only send a request for a
subpoena to the clerk of the court. The subpoena will be issued as a matter
of course. So, contrary to Section 3 of the ALA policy, it is usually
impossible beforehand to resist the issuance of a subpoena.
A second difficulty is that it may not be up to the party seeking to
enforce the subpoena to show that there is good cause for it. On the
contrary, the library officers may have to take formal legal action of their
own. They may have to file a motion challenging the subpoena and
requesting a hearing before a judge of the court that issued it.
20 The usual
name for this procedure is a motion to quash the subpoena.
The most significant recent legal development for privacy in libraries
is the enactment of library confidentiality statutes. At last count twenty-
three states had passed laws requiring that patron records be kept confiden-
tial.
21 These statutes are remarkable for their variety (or lack of
uniformity), though they can be classed into two main groups. One group
is composed of exceptions to a general open records statute, the other, of
independent library privacy acts.
22
With one exception the prohibition of disclosure is absolute in the
sense that there is no provision for the exercise of discretion by the custo-




The following public records shall be kept confidential, unless otherwise
ordered by a court, by the lawful custodian of the records, or by another
person duly authorized to release information.... 13. The records of a
library which, by themselves or when examined with other public
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records, would reveal the identity of the library patron checking out or
requesting an item from the library.
The first part of the statute dispenses with an absolute duty and leaves
room for an independent decision by the librarian. Notice that the strength
of the statute as a ground for the refusal to disclose records remains intact.
Some statutes actually impose civil or criminal liability for the
improper disclosure of information about a library patron.
24 That is
unnecessary. An ethical obligation can be enforced without having to be
transformed into a legal duty. Complaint, criticism, and reprimand can all
be brought to bear to enforce ethical standards.
May civil liability be imposed under a library confidentiality statute
that says nothing about it? It is possible. A common-law rule permits it.
The Second Restatement of Torts puts the rule this way:
When a legislative provision protects a class of persons by proscribing or
requiring certain conduct but does not provide a civil remedy for the
violation, the court may, if it determines that the remedy is appropriate
in furtherance of the purpose of the legislation and needed to assure the
effectiveness of the provision, accord to an injured member of die class a
right of action, using a suitable existing tort action or a new cause of
action analogous to an existing tort action.
I am not aware that a lawsuit for breach of confidence has been
brought against a librarian. Now that the possibility exists, my concern is
that librarians did not adequately consider beforehand the implications of
enacting library confidentiality statutes. The statutes' purpose was to find
an adequate means of protecting library patrons. Librarians' altruism may
have obscured the prudential implications of imposing a legal duty. Ulti-
mately, a judgment of the wisdom of shouldering this duty will depend on
librarians' view of its importance for maintaining ethical standards and of
the potential for harm to our patrons that might flow from a breach.
A case arising under the Iowa library confidentiality statute was
decided by the Iowa Supreme Court in 1983.
26 The court denied claims that
a sweeping subpoena to the Des Moines Public Library violated the first-
amendment rights of patrons and was unreasonable and oppressive. A
recent casenote in the Iowa Law Review discusses the case (Brown v.
Johnston) in detail.
27 The author points out that the court's first-
amendment analysis was inadequate. The article presents a good argu-
ment in favor of a constitutional right of privacy in public library
circulation records.
If the first amendment is to ensure an informed citizenry by guaranteeing
a right to receive information and ideas; a right to privacy in library
circulation records should be extended to public library patrons. Com-
pelled disclosure of library records, like forced disclosure of organiza-
tional membership, would discourage individuals from seeking or
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receiving unpopular or controversial ideas contained in certain books
because other people might learn of their inquiries and take retaliatory
economic or social steps to discourage the library patrons' further
inquiry.
28
The Iowa legislature responded quickly to the Brown decision. It
passed an amendment to the confidentiality statute.
The records shall be released to a criminal justice agency only pursuant
to an investigation of a particular person or organization suspected of
committing a known crime. The records shall be released only upon a
judicial determination that a rational connection exists between the
requested release of information and a legitimate end and that the need
for the information is cogent and compelling.
29
This addition plus the provision for the exercise of discretion make the
Iowa statute nearly ideal.
Suggestions for Assuring Library Privacy
Here are some suggestions and considerations for implementing a
confidentiality assurance program in the library. The library's confiden-
tiality policy should be included in the personnel manual and discussed
with staff members. Circulation procedures should be reviewed to locate
points where accidental disclosures might occur. Do overdue and reserve
notices go out on postcards or in envelopes? If notices are given over the
telephone, it may be necessary to have the patron return the call if someone
else answers.
How much information should be requested at the time of registra-
tion? Librarians should be pleased that libraries have come to be viewed as
informal institutions. Nevertheless, users have to tolerate some degree of
control.
Do any of the library's services use interest profiles? If so, how detailed
are they? Is access to them restricted?
What happens to circulation information after materials have been
returned and fines paid? Is it purged from an online system? Are any
hardcopy records maintained? It is impossible to subpoena records that do
not exist.
What is the policy for releasing records as part of an investigation or
prosecution for library theft? There may be a technical conflict here with a
confidentiality statute.
Many libraries are public places. It would be impossible to achieve the
privacy of a doctor's office in a public library nor should it be tried. Patrons
do not require or expect that a public library prevent all possibility of
disclosure. They do expect that library personnel will take precautions to
prevent unnecessary or intrusive disclosures.
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Implications of the Computer
It is fair to say that the advent of the computer played a significant role
in precipitating our present concern with the security of personal informa-
tion. Of course, the collection of information about people began well
before the arrival of the computer; the federal income tax was instituted in
1913, social security in 1936. But it is the added potential of computerized
data banks and advanced telecommunications which continue to fuel the
debate.
Few people would deny that the growth of advanced information
technology presents the risk of harm to privacy. But it is equally difficult to
ignore the benefits that clearly have been derived from this technology.
These observations can only begin the inquiry. They pose the question of
whether society will be able to integrate the new technology without
jeopardizing important privacy values.
I think the major risks come under the rubric of abuse or misuse.
Problems such as unauthorized surveillance, intentional breaches of com-
puter security, or the use of personal information for purposes beyond
those for which it was disclosed ought to be regarded as abuses to be
prevented and deterred, not as inevitable consequences. The rigorous
application of the principles of fair information practices would go a long
way toward preventing such abuses.
There is another question to confront. Is it possible that too much
ostensibly innocuous information about the individual could be collected,
even for purely benign purposes? Would people then "think more care-
fully before they did things that become part of the record?"
30 Would life
become "less spontaneous and more measured?"
* The United States could
no doubt reach such a point, though it is to be hoped that the working of a
democratic society would stop well short of it. These are difficult issues and
it has been my intention here merely to raise them rather than to offer
solutions. Whatever the answers society determines, librarians and other
information specialists are well-placed to contribute to the debate.
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